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1 | INTRODUCTION
The historical individual, or rather the absence of the historical individual, in modern philosophy is at the centre of
the three lectures collected in The Sovereignty of Good and at the centre of Murdoch's moral philosophy taken as a
whole. Murdoch is driven by the insight, and the anxiety, that the conceptual resources available to moral philosophy
are catastrophically diminished by a picture of the human individual as ‘an isolated principle of will, or burrowing pin-
point of consciousness, inside, or beside, a lump of being which has been handed over to other disciplines’ (GG 338).
Though her contemporaries might not recognise this rather grotesque character as the hero of their philosophy,
Murdoch believes that the presence of this ‘soul-picture’ in their work is betrayed by the anaemic character of the
moral scene they describe. Such a soul-picture, Murdoch argues, has left ethicists with the resources to speak only
of reasonableness, rationality, authenticity, sincerity and correctness and has transformed moral progress from a
demanding personal struggle towards unachievable perfection into a ‘mediocre achievement’ (GG 340) consisting in
‘the making of sensible choices and the giving of sensible and simple reasons’ (HT 177; GG 340; SG 364).
Murdoch argues that moral philosophy must be able speak in terms of good and evil, piety and salvation, humil-
ity and love—concepts that are connected to perfection, not mediocracy—and she thinks that these concepts get
application only against a background picture of humans as substantive individuals or selves, each with a personal
history, and a rich, unique, and ultimately private, inner life (e.g., GG 343). She proposes such a soul-picture, one that
foregrounds the privacy of individual consciousness and links both practical rationality and the moral significance of
action to the irreducible particularity of ‘an individual living in time’ (MGM 273). This soul-picture, Murdoch thinks,
will allow us to recognise that ‘the area of morals, and ergo of moral philosophy [is not a] hole-and-corner matter of
debts and promises, but [covers] the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world’
(SG 380)
In this short piece, it will only be possible to explore a tiny corner of the Murdochian vision just described. The
discussion will focus on the role in which Murdoch casts Wittgenstein in this drama between two opposing soul-
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pictures. Murdoch's engagement with Wittgenstein's writings on the meaning of mental concepts, including the so-
called ‘private language argument’, spans her whole philosophical life.1 Her first two publications—‘Thinking
and Language’ (1951) and ‘Nostalgia for the Particular’ (1952)—are concerned Wittgenstein's impact on phi-
losophy of mind and ethics. Her MGM (1992) includes a chapter on Wittgenstein that centres on a discussion
of the private linguist.
Murdoch's relationship with Wittgenstein's later thought is far from that of a disciple, and though she presents
herself as staying within the broad contours of his philosophy of mind and language,2 her reading is an exploration of
her own temperament as much as it is a cool appraisal of the text.3 But despite the novelty of her approach, her seri-
ous and systematic engagement with Wittgenstein's work illuminates links between the central themes of Philosophi-
cal Investigations and the project of virtue ethics that many interpreters of Wittgenstein have missed.4 Some of these
links are illuminated (though from a different angle) by her friend and interlocutor G. E. M. Anscombe; others are
peculiar to Murdoch.5 Murdoch's task, as I see it, is to speak of the importance of privacy and individual conscious-
ness in moral life in a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's insight that we acquire mental concepts by master-
ing a technique for the use of a term in a public linguistic practice.
2 | ETHICS WITHOUT PRIVACY
Murdoch begins ‘The Idea of Perfection’ by sketching the ‘theory of human nature’ (IP 300) that she finds at work in
much modern—by which she means, post-Wittgensteinian British—moral philosophy, of which the work of Hare (1952),
Nowell-Smith (1954), and Hampshire (1959) is representative. The theory is connected with a ‘powerful image’ (IP 305)
or ‘picture of the soul’ that (she says) is rarely fully articulated by these writers, but which she will seek to extract and
describe (IP 300). What strikes Murdoch about this ‘image’—and what, as we will see, makes it so damaging to the pros-
pect of a perfectionist ethics—is the extent to which it downplays or eradicates what is inner, private, personal and indi-
vidual in favour of what is outer, public, universal and general, and describes a subject who is ‘for ever capable of
“stepping back”’ (GG 399) and postponing his attention to the ‘the reality that surrounds [him]’.6
Characteristically, Murdoch alerts us to the presence of this soul-picture by noting a change in imagery: for this pic-
ture ‘touch and movement, not vision, supply our metaphors’ (IP 301).7 In place of a subject who observes, searches, con-
templates, reflects, and introspects, this new Hero is first and foremost an agent, a locus of material change, manipulating
his surroundings, ‘moving things about in a public world’ (IP 302).8 Picking up, pushing, shaping, carrying, holding, fetching,
making. His thought, indeed all his inner life, is directed outward, onto the world, and is treated as real, definite and signif-
icant only insofar as it concerns and issues in publicly observable action.
Central to this Hero's mental activity are intention and decision; but not the idle kinds. Not for him the specula-
tive musing, ‘one of these days I will return to the land of my father’, or the diffuse decision to be a little braver in
love. Instead, the intention to leave now, immediately acted upon; the decision to get engaged, followed straight-
away by a proposal of marriage. Idle and diffuse intention and decision, if such things are admitted at all into this
soul-picture, are ‘merely day-dream’ (IP 304). Murdoch calls the image behaviourist (IP 305): the Hero's mental activ-
ity is manifested in his public acts.
This change in image, Murdoch tells us, goes hand-in-hand in the writing of modern moral philosophers with a
view about the relationship between will, or desire, and value. The ‘public world’ in which our Hero moves is ‘poten-
tially open to all observers’ (IP 304): it is the world of scientific, value-neutral, interpersonal facts. This Hero is the
source of value in the world, and it is his choices, his desires, that confer value on value-neutral objects in a value-
neutral world (IP 305). Because movement not vision provide the metaphors, and because the public world is
observer-neutral, there is no talk of this man seeing, recognising, apprehending what is good, independently of his indi-
vidual will.9 Rather his ‘will is pure choice, pure movement’ and enjoys an unconstrained ‘omnipotent’ freedom, as it
is his will alone that determines value (IP 305). It is this radical, individual freedom that leads Murdoch to label the
image existentialist (IP 305).
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The Hero's choices determine what is of value. But once he has chosen, public universal rules for action,
based on utility-calculations, determine the most rational course of action for him to take. For example, given a
desire to alleviate his thirst and the presence of a glass of water, he will (should, ought rationally to) form the
intention to pick up the glass and drink from it. The force of this practical ‘ought’ comes from a universal rule:
‘Anyone with the desire to alleviate thirst ought ceteris paribus to drink a glass of water’. This rule involves a
flight from the particular to the universal: there is nothing about him, qua individual, that makes it the case that
he ought to do such-and-such; rather he ought because anyone in his situation ought. The ceteris paribus clause
again makes no reference to him as an individual but is filled out with general descriptions that delimit the situa-
tions in which the rule applies: such as ‘if the glass is easily available’, ‘if no great harm will be done by drinking
it’ and so forth. So-called ‘moral norms’ or ‘moral principles’ also govern what a man ought rationally to do, and
the aspiration of a moral philosopher who adopts this Hero is to show that it is always most rational—pruden-
tial—for him to act under moral principles (ceteris paribus). The good, Murdoch writes, is on this view ‘the tool of
every rational man’—a contention that diminishes and domesticates the Good by identifying it with this rational
procedure (IP 301). Murdoch—albeit idiosyncratically—calls this ‘utilitarian in its assumption that morality is and
can only be concerned with public acts’ (IP 305).
The picture is complex and multifaceted. It would be a task for another place to investigate the extent to which
the existentialist, behaviourist and utilitarian elements Murdoch identifies in this picture can be separated out and
made components of other, different, soul-pictures, or whether Murdoch has identified a single, mutually entailing
cluster, logically or metaphysically bound together. This question does not arise for Murdoch in The Sovereignty of
Good, because her aim is only to describe a picture she finds at work in modern moral philosophy and, she says, in
‘almost every contemporary novel’ (IP 304). Whether that Hero might have been different is, in the context of
Murdoch's project here, a question of historical speculation and not of logic.10
Murdoch is struck by the difficulty this picture of human nature poses for the moral concepts that are char-
acteristic of the Christian tradition. This recalls Anscombe's complaint in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that it
would show a certain ‘provinciality of mind’ not to take as highly significant the ‘incompatibility’ of modern
moral philosophy with ‘the whole of the Hebrew-Christian ethic’ (Anscombe, 1958: 34). Here, Anscombe is
reflecting specifically on the consequentialist tenor of modern philosophy, but like Murdoch she traces the
roots of consequentialism to the absence of a ‘philosophy of psychology’ that can sustain talk of human good-
ness (Anscombe, 1958: 38ff ). Murdoch makes her version of this point in terms of imagery: the source meta-
phors of modern moral philosophy are at odds with those of Christian ethics; there has been a shift in our moral
language from metaphors of vision to metaphors of choice, and this shift has far-reaching implications for our
thought and talk about morality.11 The Hero of modern philosophy is a man busily engaged in public deeds,
thinking of himself only under categories that are universal and general, conducting his business according to
abstract rules of rational conduct. The moral enters into his world at discrete and isolated moments of freely
chosen action. He is quite different to the individual of ‘the Christian ethic’, the centre of whose ethical life is
prayer, repentance, personal salvation and love, and for whom goodness is something that is attained—or at
least aimed at—over a whole lifetime of thought, word and deed.
Murdoch offers a genealogy which, like Anscombe's, seeks to show why a set of concepts that were once central
to ethics have ceased to be so, or have ceased to be usable for moderns.12 Both find their answer in the changes in
philosophy of mind and psychology that begin with Descartes and which have altered, or indeed removed, the ‘per-
manent background to human activity’ against which those concepts have their use.13
3 | THE GENEALOGY OF THE HERO
In these essays, Murdoch's way into the ‘heavily fortified position’ that is the modern Hero (IP 311) is via recent
(mid-20th-century) disputes about ‘the status of what is “private”’ (IP 306). By focussing on these disputes, she is
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able to track the influence of Wittgenstein's attack on the ‘private theatre’ of the Cartesian mind (TL 31) on moral
philosophy's image of man. This, in turn, enables her to find a foothold for the notion of an inner life in the wake of
Wittgenstein's philosophy.14
Modern moral philosophy's scepticism about, even hostility toward, that which is ‘private’ is the terminus of a
process of change that can be thought of as having two distinct phases. The Sovereignty of Good focusses on the sec-
ond phase, however if we are to understand Murdoch's genealogy and identify just how she reintroduces privacy
into ethics, we will also need to remain alert to the earlier phase. In both phases, the change in the status of what is
‘private’ is associated with a change in imagery or metaphor.15
The first phase, Descartes inaugurates a new image of the human mind as an ‘inner world’. The metaphors are
supplied by space—each subject enjoys special access to their own ‘subjective realm’, a ‘private theatre’ in which take
place events to which she is (necessarily) the only witness. Others find out about that world indirectly—relying on
her first-person reports or making uncertain inferences on the basis of her behaviour. Familiarly, this picture of the
mind imposes a structure on the way we think about first-person experience and authority, the meaning of mental
concepts, knowledge of other minds, and the privacy of the mental. It provides fertile ground for solipsism and scep-
ticism. The proposition ‘my sensations are private’, when it placed against this background, asserts the existence of
my inner realm and locates my sensations within it. It is equivalent to the assertion ‘Only I can experience this’, with
‘this’ accompanied by an act of inward pointing (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953: 246).
This picture of privacy, and of the nature and role of inner objects, dominates the Western philosophical tradi-
tion after Descartes and, as Murdoch and many others of her generation saw it, was not seriously challenged until
Wittgenstein's work from the 1930s onward. Wittgenstein's challenge marks the start of the second phase of
change, in which the view of privacy that is Murdoch's target is generated. This phase is characterised by an attempt
to dismantle the Cartesian picture via, among other things, an attack on the theory of meaning that props it up. This
attack, in turn, makes it possible to reject the Cartesian ‘private object’, which is associated with solipsism and
scepticism.
In short, it is a central part of the Cartesian picture that each individual establishes the meaning of sensation
words and mental concepts through acts of inner ostension. To picture my mind as an inner realm is to rule out the
possibility of common meaning, as only I can access my ‘private theatre’. The public sign, ‘pain’, has a shared use, per-
haps, but I must look inward to determine what I mean by ‘pain’. Wittgenstein's attack on this idea in the so-called
‘private language argument’ and in his broader exploration of the connection between meaning and use seeks to
undermine the idea what gives mental terms (and indeed words in general) their meaning is a ‘constant and rigid con-
nexion between language and experience’ (NP 243).
Murdoch tells us that the modern Hero came to be when Wittgenstein's attack on the Cartesian picture of
meaning (as something connected with baptismal acts of ostensive definition) was taken to establish that ‘mental
concepts must be analysed genetically’ (IP 306). Someone who holds that ‘mental concepts must be analysed geneti-
cally’ insists that the meaning of a mental concept is exhausted by what is learnt by a child who picks up the use of a
word. What is learnt, Wittgenstein tells us, is not a ‘private’ skill for conducting ceremonies to baptise private, inner,
objects, but a public skill with shared standards by which we—her linguistic community—can measure her success;
this is the case for all concepts, including mental ones.
To recall, Wittgenstein reminds us that a language-learning child is taught techniques for the public use of
words.16 The use of words is interwoven into complex patterns of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, and a large
part of what must be learnt is the ability to participate in those practices in which words have their home. This will
involve learning much that is not straightforwardly ‘linguistic’.17 A child is taught explicitly (in the sense that these
things belong to the activity we call ‘teaching a child the meaning of a word’) by a combination of ostensive defini-
tion, guided listening, linguistic and non-linguistic explanation, and so on. But perhaps, the more important part of
her teaching is implicit and is the result of her being welcomed, by her parents and by other adults who care for her,
as a participant in the form of life into which she is born. This ‘welcome’ involves, for example, ‘as if’ participation;
play, singing, simplified versions of complex rituals, being around adults who speak with each other and to her, and
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so on. The child is said to have acquired the concept that a word denotes when she is fully able to participate in the
practices in which the word has application, one criterion of which is that she uses the word spontaneously in ways
that accord with the linguistic practices of her community.
The claim that ‘mental concepts must be analysed genetically’ is not the (mere) claim that to acquire mental con-
cepts is to acquire techniques for the public use of words. It is this, plus the additional claim that the techniques
learnt exhaust the meaning of mental concepts. As Murdoch puts it, it is the claim that ‘I do not “move on”’, that the
‘outer structure’ that characterises the public practice for the use of the word, and that I learn at the beginning of my
life as a language-using animal, is (and remains) ‘the essence of the matter’ (IP 309).
This is the place to situate Murdoch's explanation of the dominance of the behaviourist-existentialist-utilitarian
soul-picture. If mental concepts are analysed genetically then only those publicly observable patterns of behaviour
that can contribute to the mastery of a public technique are relevant to the meaning of mental concepts. This rules
out the sort of deepening or development in understanding that might occur from ‘more careful consider[ation]’
(IP 309) on the part of the learner, except where that consideration is oriented outward onto features of the public
practice that might involve more subtle dimensions of behaviour and speech. The idea of moral growth—for example,
increasing clarity about the meaning of friendship or the quality of love—can be understood only as that of ever more
skilful mastery of a public technique. As the significance of anything ‘inner’ or private for the meaning of mental con-
cepts is diminished, to the point of vanishing, moral concepts must also find their application in the public sphere at
moments of freely chosen action. We also see here why, for Murdoch, a moral philosophy that arises from the sup-
position that mental concepts must be analysed genetically will tend toward mediocracy. A study of what is learnt
when a child masters the technique for the use of a word is necessarily a study of the ordinary. The use of words
cannot be taught by appeal to what is extraordinary, transcendent, superlative, remarkable but must rather look to
what is common, banal and everyday (these terms, of course, being relative to what is being taught).18
4 | WHAT IF THE PRIVATE LINGUIST WERE ALIVE?
Murdoch wants to accept much, perhaps all, of Wittgenstein's attack on the Cartesian picture of the mind.
Wittgenstein's description of language learning aims to break the hold of view of meaning that is integral to that pic-
ture. Wittgenstein demonstrates that structure necessary for linguistic meaning [‘the rigidity that creates meaning’
(NP 247)] is located in the ‘social framework’ (NP 244). The idea of a ‘constant and rigid connection’ between word
and object is a myth, as much for the names of material objects as for those of inner experiences. Wittgenstein's
descriptions remind us that the language we use to speak of our private experiences, the language in which the
would-be solipsist frames his hypothesis, is itself the product of our lives together. Anything that is private ‘cannot
form part of the structure of a public concept’ (IP 306).
However, Murdoch does not accept the idea that mental concepts must be analysed genetically, an idea that
emerges when the specific the target of Wittgenstein's argument—the Cartesian picture of meaning—is forgotten,
thereby transforming it into a quite general attack on the idea of privacy. Murdoch's insight is that any attack on pri-
vacy made by Wittgenstein is an attack on the Cartesian conception of the private object and as such is not an attack
on privacy, or the private object, as such.
Recall that modern philosophers' rejection of the private is the terminus of a process of philosophical change
with two distinct phases. The second phase, on which we have focussed, involves rejecting objects that populate the
Cartesian ‘inner realm’ as the source of meaning for mental concepts. With that rejection, modern moral philosophers
come to locate everything that is significant to meaning, including the meaning of mental concepts, in the public
realm. But it was the first, Cartesian, phase that established the framework—associated with metaphors of space—
within which the notion of ‘privacy’ that is Wittgenstein's target is understood. As Wittgenstein's target is that
framework, Murdoch is surely right to suppose that in insisting that what is private ‘cannot form part of the structure
of a public concept’ his target is not privacy as such, but privacy as it is explained or understood within the Cartesian
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framework. Wittgenstein does not say that the proposition ‘sensations are private’ is false or nonsense but rather: it
is comparable to ‘One plays patience by oneself’ (Wittgenstein, 1953: 248). Murdoch insists, in words that are remi-
niscent of Wittgenstein's own, ‘[t]he choice must be rejected between logical behaviourism and the private theatre’
(TL 31; compare Wittgenstein, 1953: 308). As Wittgenstein sweeps away the Cartesian picture of the private inner
realm, there is no reason to suppose that the picture of the human he leaves behind is not a suitable background for
another, ethically significant, notion of privacy. This is Murdoch's contention.
One ‘change in imagery’ that Wittgenstein advocates as part of his attack on the Cartesian picture of mind, is to
adopt the whole human animal, including her life with other such animals, as the object of philosophical investigation.
This move means drawing metaphors from the concept of life and not geometry.19 With life comes notions of habi-
tat and culture, instinct and activity, games, gestures, children and suffering, as well as the historical individual, tem-
porality, change and growth. Murdoch follows Wittgenstein here, seeing that she can locate the privacy of the inner
in the use that a person who has acquired a public concept goes on to make of it as she progresses through her life.
Murdoch reflects that ‘in real life’ someone who has learnt the technique for the use of a word and has mastered all
there is to master in a public practice, is ‘an individual living in time’ and has (in virtue of this fact) a unique past
behind her and a unique future ahead of her (MGM 273). This future will make particular demands on the concepts
she has acquired, demands that may lead her beyond what she was taught, either explicitly or implicitly, in the life
she has so far led. The simple fact of her individuality—she alone is living her life—means that the tools she acquired
when she learnt a language will themselves become particularised, personalised, over time. It is here, in this process
of individualising—a process possible only for a human who is already one among others, speaking a shared
language—that Murdoch re-finds the private.
We might use Murdoch's famed discussion of ‘M and D’ to illustrate this process (IP 312), but instead I want to take
her less familiar example of a ‘man trying privately to determine whether what he “feels” is repentance or not’ (IP 312,
319). This example is striking for a number of reasons (not least its connection with the Christian concepts of sin and sal-
vation)—but I choose it here because with it Murdoch provides us with a flesh-and-blood version of Wittgenstein's ‘pri-
vate linguist’ (Wittgenstein, 1953: 258). This is a novelist's trick she also pursues in MGM (269–91).
Like Murdoch's man, Wittgenstein's linguist is trying privately to work out what he feels. But where
Wittgenstein's private linguist seeks to name a private object, ‘S’, using only the resources that would be available to
him were the mind as the Cartesian pictures it, Murdoch's man is an ‘individual living in time’ (MGM 273).
Wittgenstein's private linguist, Murdoch writes, remains ‘trapped’ in a ‘fable’ that contains a philosophical moral for a
theorist who has accepted the Cartesian picture (MGM 273). To make him flesh and blood, writes Murdoch, we will
have to settle ‘an immense number of details about character and situation’, details that Wittgenstein's fable leaves
out: ‘Is he mad, a trickster, a liar, a foreigner, a genius, a poet, almost anyone trying to “make something out”?’
(Wittgenstein, 1953).20 In IP, Murdoch takes up the last of those suggestions: he is almost anyone trying to ‘make
something out’, viz. whether what he now feels is repentance.
Far from striking us as a logical impossibility, this man's struggle—to describe his feeling, to decide whether what he
is feeling is properly captured by the name ‘repentance’, to figure out whether what he now feels is the same feeling as
before, when he was confident in naming it such—is a familiar one. It provides subject matter for numerous novels, diaries
and confessions. Is what I feel love or infatuation? Guilt or remorse? Nausea or excitement? Or something new and quite
sui generis? As we bring the linguist back into human life we must keep fixed what we learnt from Wittgenstein: here is
an historical individual who was born into a word structured by human concepts—patterns of speech, action and
behaviour—that he mastered as he has ‘grew to the age of reason in a shared world’.21 He learnt mental concepts by mas-
tering public techniques for the use of words; private ostensive definition was no part of that training and his own, per-
haps idiosyncratic, experiences did not enter into the meaning of the words he acquired. And yet, despite his mastery of
these techniques, he now finds himself, in a way that is familiar, struggling with the words he has.
Suppose our linguist says, out loud or to himself, ‘I repent’, in the context of the proper religious ritual or setting
(cf. IP 311). The language he has learnt puts him in a position both to utter these words meaningfully and to pose a
question: ‘But do I really repent?’. That question is surely not the same as the question ‘have I properly performed
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the public ritual that gives the concept its application?’ To answer either question he can, and may, make use of our
shared rules for the use of the word ‘repent’. He may, with Austin, consult the dictionary or the law-book.22 He may
reflect on his own behaviour—for example, he may consider whether he uttered the words ‘I repent’ timidly or in a
sarcastic tone. But such explorations, if they are conducted in a spirit of serious moral reflection (particularly, if they
take place within an ethical frame that sees genuine repentance as central to moral progress and to goodness), may
at some point require him to step beyond ‘the impersonal world of language’ and to focus his attention inward
(IP 319). He may consider what repentance would be for him, the individual that he is, with a life and history that is
his alone. He may worry that the feeling he has is not sharp enough, painful enough or consuming enough; or he
may be concerned that its temporal structure belies a shallowness inconsistent with the real thing.23 Here, Murdoch
writes, he will be ‘making a specialised use of a concept’, one in which he ‘takes [the concept] away into his privacy’
(IP 319).24 This ‘taking away’ must be temporary if he is to remain one who lives among others and whose language
is a tool for living that shared life. But, for Murdoch, the work that he does with and on his concept when he retreats
to private reflection gives his concept—though not our concept—structure that is idiosyncratic and which makes that
work properly characterizable as ‘moral activity’. When he returns to the public realm with his concept, new patterns,
structures and connections will be visible to him: he may, for example, now at last see his mother's slavishness to his
father as an expression of her guilt, or a stranger's story as a vehicle of confession. He may see his own past anew.
Before drawing out some of the ethical implications of this move, it will be helpful to compare the notion of the
‘inner’ or ‘private’ that emerges here in Murdoch's thought with that which John McDowell (1989, 1993) has sought
to make available, also in the aftermath of Wittgenstein's ‘private-language argument’.25 For McDowell, the ‘inner
realm’ is regained by replicating the conceptual structure of the ‘social framework’ in the mind. The lesson he takes
from the private language argument is that just as the public realm is conceptually structured, so is the private.26
There is no ‘pre-conceptual given’ on the outside, and nor any on the inside. This move commits McDowell to a num-
ber of theses that are quite alien to Murdoch, of which I highlight three. First, McDowell's full-blown conceptualism
locks the inner and outer structure together, so that objects of inner contemplation are presented to the subject
always already with the conceptual structure that characterises linguistic thought. For McDowell, there can be no
inner experience that lacks the articulacy of language. Second, McDowell's picture makes no sense of the sort of
growth and change that Murdoch describes as the result of ‘taking a concept away into privacy’. Private reflection,
for McDowell, will be fully constrained by ‘the impersonal world of language’, and, like the limited conceptual devel-
opment available on the genetic theory of meaning, it can amount only to ever more skilful mastery of a public tech-
nique. Third, because McDowell's notion of experience is articulated in terms of propositional content (the basic
form of experience is that p; that things are thus and so), inner experience must be understood as experience of facts
not particulars.27 In contrast, for Murdoch an individual's reflection on her experience involves unmediated attention
to the particular, attention that may reveal the inadequacy of public concepts. As such, Murdoch's picture contains
the possibility of an individual moving beyond public concepts that would lock her into a particular set of conven-
tional descriptions.28 This sort of reflection, for Murdoch, involves her ‘moving away from the shared world into
which she is born’—moving away, that is, from the ‘conceptual scheme’ reflected in her language.
To situate this difference in the context of Murdoch's genealogy, we might say: McDowell accepts the change in
imagery that comes from Descartes, and seeks to accommodate Wittgenstein's insights within a picture dominated
by Cartesian metaphors supplied by space: ‘inner realm’, ‘theatre of consciousness’, ‘inner experience’ (cf. McDowell,
1989: 279–280 and McDowell, 1993: 297). Murdoch follows Wittgenstein in seeking a return to metaphors supplied
by life.
5 | WHAT IF THE PRIVATE LINGUIST WERE A POET?
As I have presented it, Murdoch's view is that the possibility of the private use of public concepts is not one that is at
odds with Wittgenstein's insight that the public human world is structured by concepts, and that what a child must do in
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order to belong to such a world is catch on to those structures (rules) and live within them. What creates a prob-
lem for privacy is the genetic analysis of concepts, which treats language-users generically, leaving them con-
strained, trapped and determined by the rules that structure their world. Murdoch asks us to remember in our
ethics the particular individual—someone who lives her life in amongst this structure – and not think only of
what is general and shared.29
We can now locate this contrast between a life lived by rules and a life living in amongst rules in Murdoch's
ethics. Although Murdoch's focus on moral vision has attracted more attention, she is in no way hostile to the idea
that rule-governed activity is a large-part of moral life, and that in these areas the modern moral philosophers against
which she sets herself were right to think that the individual is of no special significance. If I am acting under a general
moral principle, I may be anyone—a rule is ‘impersonal’ in that sort of way:
In a simple easy unimportant choice there is no need to regard “what goes on” as anything beyond
the obvious sequence of reason, decision, action, or just reason, action; and such choices may be
properly regarded as “impersonal”. “Shall I go on? Oh yes, I promised to.” I receive my bill and I pay
it. (IP 328)
This area of the moral life does involve ‘giving of sensible reasons’ and is characterised by full and unproblematic
articulacy about what is done and why. But, this area of moral activity is a sub-area of human activity—a part of a
whole. What Murdoch adds to this is a description of moral activity that shows moral life to be our life as such,
shows ethics to be ‘the whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world’ (SG 380). Her pic-
ture of the private use of concepts by an individual—their taking public structure in a private realm, and there
augmenting, altering, deepening that structure, before returning it back to a life among others—entitles her to this. If
what is ‘open to [an] observer’ is what she can grasp in thought, and if what she can grasp in thought depends on the
concepts she has, this activity alters the world in which that individual lives: ‘it is an activity which puts in question
the existence of such an impersonal world’ (IP 319).
These two activities—the public use of concepts in the impersonal sequence of reason, action, and the private
use of concepts by an individual—exist side-by-side in the life of an individual. A life with too much of the former will
look slavish, unreflective, shallow; a life with too much of the latter will look self-serving, precious, isolated. (It may
attract the moral or religious form of Wittgenstein's injunction: ‘Do not try to analyse your inner experience’ (MGM
270)). At any moment ‘Oh yes, I promised to’ may throw up a question about friendship or justice or sincerity; equally
the impersonal demand of duty (I must collect my child from school) may intervene in a private meditation on paren-
tal love. A rich ethical, human, life will involve both moments in balance.
To close, I want to situate one final, crucial, aspect of Murdoch's ethics in this context: the role of metaphorical
language in the moral realm. Again, Murdoch has resources available here that McDowell does not, so this marks
another dimension of difference between them.
Above we followed Murdoch's suggestion that one way to bring the private linguist to life was to think of him as
almost anyone trying to ‘make something out’. At the end of exploring that case, I said that the additional structure
this individual gave to his concept of remorse (that was the example) was structure that belonged to his concept, and
not to our concept. But Murdoch offers several other imaginative suggestions that we have not yet explored,
amongst which is the possibility that the private linguist is a poet, and it is the poet-linguist who I end by presenting.
Murdoch writes:
We naturally create metaphors in the context of certain kinds of attempt to describe. … This is typical
of our use of language to fix in a semi-sensible picture some aspect of our activities—and such fixing
is using, or creating, concepts. This is not to say, again, that the notion of a concept as ‘how a word is
used’ is not a useful, even essential one. It is to say it is perhaps not the only one of philosophical
interest. (TL 33)
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In his earlier incarnation, the everyday linguist took a public concept (remorse) ‘away into privacy’ and in doing
so gave new, individualised, structure to his concept, with which he then returned to the public world. The poet lin-
guist has the potential to do something far more radical. Her attempt to articulate particular feelings and experiences
for which she has no ready-made words, leads her to form metaphors and similes in an attempt to be articulate. If
she is a great poet, those metaphors will be ones that others can understand, take up, and use for themselves. This is
why, for Murdoch, ‘the renewal of language’ is ‘par excellence the task of poetry’ (TL 28). The possibility described
here is not the individual achievement of the renewal of my language, but renewal of our language, and renewal of
this kind – as the shifting of metaphors from vision, to space, to movement, to life, reveals—can have profound impli-
cations for the ‘permanent background to human activity’.30
ENDNOTES
1 Much less than one would like has been written on ‘Murdoch's Wittgenstein’. For exceptions, see Mac Cumhaill, (2020)
in this volume; Hämäläinen, 2014; Forsberg, 2013.
2 In her earlier writing, she is more inclined to limit her disagreement to Wittgenstein's followers, while Wittgenstein him-
self ‘remains sphinx-like in the background’ (IP 311). Later, in MGM, she takes a somewhat more critical stance, describing
him, for example, as ‘at times like a Martian staring at human affairs’ (280) and asking why he is ‘so anxious to set up this
machinery which so pointedly excludes the individual peculiarity of speaking humans?’ (281). But even there she is
ambivalent, pointing to remarks in Wittgenstein, 1977 as evidence of agreement (283).
3 The opening line of GG: ‘To do philosophy is to explore one's own temperament, and yet at the same time to attempt to
discover the truth’ (337).
4 We have been slow to appreciate the ethical significance of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Even if we accept
Williams and Montenfiore (1966) view that in his later work Wittgenstein's ‘concern is with philosophy itself, in particular
with the philosophy of logic and language’ and not with ‘moral or political topics’ (12), this should not obscure for us the
ethical significance of that work. Placed alongside Culture and Value (1977) the ethical dimension of that text is clearer
still. For an overview of Murdochian virtue ethics see Bridget Clarke (2018).
5 In Anscombe, 1958. Unfortunately, I do not have space in this essay to explore these connections in the depth they
deserve.
6 Murdoch in Mehta (1962) describes herself, Philippa Foot and G. E. M. Anscombe as interested in ‘the reality that sur-
rounds man’ (52).
7 Moore's (1903) moral philosophy provides the contrast here, it being an ethics which begins from the ‘image of vision’
(IP 301). Murdoch writes: ‘let me say in anticipation that on almost every point I agree with Moore and not with his
critics’ (IP 301).
8 I use male pronouns here self-consciously. This hero is certainly to be pictured as male.
9 G. E. Moore reference. Plato's ethics is, of course, also built around the image of vision.
10 A second, more relevant, question is whether Murdoch has accurately characterised the work of her opponents. Carla
Bagnoli raises the concern that Murdoch mispresents Hampshire's position in ‘The Exploration of Moral Life’ in Broackes
(2011), 205, fn. 25. It is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper to explore this issue.
11 See also Murdoch, 1956.
12 This is not, of course, to say that we have stopped using these words: ‘Words may mislead us here since words are often
stable while concepts alter’ (IP 322)—this goes for the individual and for the community. The use of a word can continue
long after the background against which it has meaning has ceased to exist—for example, ‘witch’ and ‘phlogiston’—or can
be retrospectively applied to a time or culture in which the background was not or is not present (e.g., applying the words
‘morally right’ to the Greeks). A source of a great many practical and political problems in human life is the difficulty we
have in perceiving when our use of a word is associated with a functioning concept, and when it is not. Mary Midgley, a
close friend of Murdoch's, writes on this topic extensively (cf. ‘Philosophical Plumbing’, ‘Is “moral” a dirty word?’, The
Myths we Live By). The discussion of Wittgenstein on language, below, elucidates this point. See also Mac Cumhaill 2020,
in this volume.
13 This phrase is Murdoch's (GG 343). See also Anscombe, 1958, 38.
14 Readers familiar with Murdoch's philosophy will know that there are many paths through her work, and that the lines of
argument are tightly woven and interlacing. In focusing on this theme, which is a dominant one in these essays, I pick one
path and leave others untrodden.
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15 It seems to me that this notion of a change in image or metaphor is connected with what Wittgenstein calls ‘the first step’
that ‘altogether escapes notice’ in philosophy (1953: 308). We adopt a picture that then constrains our philosophical
thinking. Going back to the ‘first step’ often involves making explicit the metaphors and images that are at work in our
thinking and showing that they can be otherwise.
16 This is paragraph is a highly compressed summary of the first part of Wittgenstein, 1953. For more detailed exegesis
along these lines see, for example, Anscombe, 1976, Baker, 2004a and 2004b.
17 For example, the builders of §2 learn ‘slab’ and ‘pillar’ in the context of learning to build. See also Anscombe (1976: 117)
for an illuminating discussion of ‘length’ and Cavell (1979: 177) for remarks on ‘love’.
18 It goes without saying that there is much more to be said about Murdoch's genealogy. For a helpful and detailed over-
view, see Broackes's (2011) introduction. See also Mac Cumhaill (2020) in this volume.
19 We could follow Anscombe and Foot in seeing this as a move to Aristotelian or Medieval categories (e.g. in Anscombe,
1958 and Foot, 2001) but this association is more problematic in Murdoch's case given Platonic, rather than Aristotelian,
sympathies.
20 Compare the character Bruno in Bruno's Dream. Browning (2019) suggests with think of Bruno as M (in M & D) (178), but
a comparison with the private-linguist made flesh in MGM is perhaps more fitting. Whether Bruno is ‘mad, a trickster, a
liar’ or ‘almost anyone trying to “make something out”’ seems to me to be left open by Murdoch the novelist.
21 This locution is Anscombe's (1957: 8). He must have mastered those techniques if we are to make sense of him as ‘trying
to make something out’—if he had not mastered those techniques we would perhaps move him to the first category
(‘mad’) or to some other category that would recognise that he had failed to grasp the patterns that constitute our shared
form of life.
22 Austin (1957: 15) describes the philosopher's tools as the dictionary and the law. The distance between Murdoch and
Austin here illuminates the distance between Wittgenstein's view of language, and that of the so-called ‘ordinary lan-
guage’ philosophers.
23 It is familiar enough that people who are struggling with grief or guilt may question the depth and sincerity of their feeling
in just these sorts of ways, and that such questioning may in fact compound their grief and deepen their feeling of guilt.
24 It is interesting to note that Murdoch thinks such a retreat may also be possible ‘in limited societies’ or ‘communities of
two’ (TL 29).
25 I discuss McDowell here because he is often thought of as a virtue ethicist of a Murdochian stripe (c.f. Broackes, 2011:
8–10, Clarke, 2018: 35ff). If I am right, McDowell's picture of the mind rules out deep affinity between his ethics and
Murdoch's. For the purposes of this paper I ignore McDowell's recent appeal to ‘intuitional content’ in experience; after
all, it is in his 1979 paper, ‘Virtue and Reason’, that he compares his moral philosophy to Murdoch's.
26 McDowell insists that this is an articulation of Wittgenstein's own view, though he acknowledges that his reading must
‘query [Wittgenstein's] sureness of foot’ in §293 and §304 (McDowell, 1989: 283).
27 For connections between Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1921) and McDowell's discussion of PLA, see Wiseman (2009).
28 See, for example, ‘Considered as a content of thought, language may have a revelatory role…or it may have the opposite
role…. Language and thought are not co-extensive. That this is so is obvious if we consider the experience of attempting to
break through a linguistic formulation grasped as inadequate to an obscurely apprehended content. We know too what it is
like for thought to be stifled by a conventional description, or for a verbal summary to replace a memory image.’ (TL 28).
29 The extent to which Murdoch disagreement with Wittgenstein here is a matter of emphasis rather than substance is
unclear. In MGM she is inclined to be more critical of Wittgenstein (rather than merely his followers) than in SG and the
earlier writings.
30 Thank you to the philosophy department at Queen's University, Canada—especially Christian Sypnowich, David Bakhurst,
Lesley Jamieson and Jacqueline Maxwell—for organising and inviting me to their Murdoch Centenary Conference, and to
the audience at that conference for stimulating papers and discussion (in particular Gary Browning and Laurence Blum).
My deepest thanks, once again, to Clare Mac Cumhaill for many discussions and detailed comments on this piece.
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